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Abstract 
The review of recent literature shows the relationship between shadow 
economy and economic growth is ambiguous. This paper attempts to 
answer whether the relationship between shadow economy and 
economic growth depends on the level of development or not? In this 
way, the Shadow Economy Kuznets’s Curve (SEKC) is estimated in two 
quadratic -Inverted U- and cubic -N shape- functional form by using 
shadow economies data of 21 selected OECD countries for time period 
of 1995-2006. The panel data analyses results show that cubic 
functional form justifies the relationship between shadow economy and 
economic growth better, this relationship depends on the level of 
development and the shadow economy has a positive effect on the 
official economy. 
JEL Classification: O17, O4, C23 
Keywords: Shadow economy, economic growth, Kuznets’s curve, panel data 
analysis, OECD. 
Introduction 
Economic activities may be classified under a structural approach into two 
major group namely formal economy and shadow economy. It is stated that the 
main stimulus behind the actions of economic agents in their inclinations 
toward shadow economy is the creation of a non-transparent setting of 
activities in order to escape legal frameworks. Such as issue i.e., regulation 
evasion, may in its turn be the result of numerous stimulating factors some of 
which are related with the way of government intervention, some other arise 
from the structure of macro-economy and some further stimulating factors arise 
from the nature of a certain economic activity. Among such factors are the 
system for granting economic privileges, implementation of different rationing 
                                                 
1- Ph.D. student, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management University Putra 
Malaysia (UPM), Email address: hessamnik@yahoo.com and gs18533@mutiara.upm.edu.my. 
 
2 - Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management 
University Putra Malaysia (UPM), 43400 UPM Serdang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia.  Email 
address: muzafar@econ.upm.edu.my,Tel.: +603-89467635 ;Fax: +603-89486188        
 
3 - Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, A-4040 
Linz-Auhof, Austria. Phone: 0043-732-2468-8210, Fax: -8209. E-mail: friedrich.schneider@jku.at. 
  2 
systems, tax burden, social security burden, the specifications of taxation 
system and totally the factors interfering with competitive environment in 
economy. 
Although in recent years, the shadow economy literature especially on 
definition, methods to estimate and main causes has improved well, the effects 
on official economic growth are yet ambiguous. Summarizing the literature, 
every in this field focused on a case study for a particular country. Thus, the 
subject needs to be approached on the basis of empirical work across the 
countries to prove the relationship between shadow economy and economic 
growth. 
Objectives of the study  
This study has the following specific objectives: 
• To explain the basic concepts of shadow economy and economic 
growth through extensively review of literatures. 
• Investigate the relationship between shadow economy and economic 
growth based on the Kuznets’s law from 21 OECD countries.  
• To suggest recommendations based on the findings.  
This paper tends to analyze the relationship between shadow economy and 
economic growth by using Kuznets’s curve. In the other words, this paper 
attempts to answer whether the relationship between shadow economy and 
economic growth depends on the level of development or not? 
Theoretical and empirical view of shadow and official economy  
According to Chen (2007), there are at least three schools of thought on link 
between shadow and formal economies: dualism, structuralism, and legalism. 
The “dualists” argue that shadow activities have few linkages to the official 
economy but, rather, operate as a separate sector. This approach is based on the 
neoclassical hypothesis that rigidities in the official sector, introduced through 
legislation or negotiation, segment the market (Harris and Todaro, 1970). The 
dualist hypothesis asserts that these two sectors are subsidiaries through 
common factors that lead to the flow of workers and activities from formal to 
the shadow economy. 
The “structuralists” consider the shadow and formal sectors as intrinsically 
linked. Formal enterprises promote informal production and employment 
relationships with subordinated economic units and workers to reduce their 
input costs (Chen, 2007). According to this approach, both informal enterprises 
and informal wage workers are inclined to meet the interests of increasing the 
competitiveness of regular firms, providing cheap goods and services. 
Consequently, growing official economy boosts unofficial production. 
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The “legalists” direct their interest on the relationship between shadow 
activities and the formal regulatory environment, not formal firms (Chen, 
2007), which is attributed to the fact that the capitalist interests collude with 
government to set the formal “rules of the game” (de Soto, 1989). 
Another viewpoint to examine the economic consequences of shadow 
economy on official economy is based on the analysis of the nature of this 
relationship. It means that the interest of economist is to know if substitution 
effects prevail on complementary ones. When the complementarities between 
unofficial and official economy overcome the substitution effects, larger 
shadow economy should stimulate the official growth. 
It fits the structuralist hypothesis. The economic explanation is that the 
value-added created in the shadow economy is spent (also) in the official 
sector. At the same time, more official production increases the demand of 
unofficial goods and services. 
The alternative hypothesis that substitution effects between unofficial and 
official GDP prevail on complementarities, is basically based on the idea that 
unofficial activities, creating unfair competition, interferes negatively with the 
market allocation. 
From the demand side, a lack of transparency may distort the information 
flows, thus making difficult market competition and an efficient comparison of 
goods and services. From production side, the untaxed return of investment of 
the unofficial business activities may attract resources from official firms. It is 
due to the fact that more productive investments of official activities may have 
lower taxed returns than unofficial ones. Then the misallocation slows down 
economic growth. 
So there are two views about the relationship between these two variables. 
One of these argues the relationship between shadow and official economy is 
negative and the other one emphasizes is positive.   
The negative relationship between shadow and official economy  
One hypothesis is that a substantial reduction of the shadow economy leads to a 
significant increase in tax revenues and therefore to a greater quantity and 
quality of public goods and services, which ultimately can stimulate economic 
growth. Some authors found evidence for this hypothesis. 
Since many Latin American countries had or still have a tradition of 
excessive regulations and weak government institutions, Loayza (1996) finds 
some evidence of the implications of his growth model in the early 1990s in 
these countries: the increase in the size of the shadow economy negatively 
affects growth (1) by reducing the availability of public services for everyone 
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in the economy, and (2) by using the existing public services less efficiently, or 
not at all. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) find, in a cross sectional analysis, a strong and 
significantly positive relationship between social capital variable and economic 
growth. Since the social capital is measured as willingness to pay taxes 
voluntarily, the higher is the level of social capital; the lower is the incentive to 
get involved in informal sector. Hence one may conclude that there is a 
negative relationship between the growth of the shadow economy and the 
official one. 
A recent study by Loayza (1996) presents a simple macroeconomic 
endogenous growth model whose production technology depends on congest 
able public services. The determinants and effects of the informal sector are 
studied, where excessive taxes and regulations are imposed by governments 
and where the capability to enforce compliance is low.  
The model concludes that in economies where (1) the statutory tax burden 
is larger than the optimal tax burden, and where (2) the enforcement of 
compliance is too weak, the increase of the relative size of the informal 
economy generates a reduction of economic growth. The reason for this 
correlation is the strongly negative correlation between the informal sector and 
public infrastructure indices, while public infrastructure is the key element for 
economic growth. For example, Loayza finds empirical evidence for Latin 
America countries that if the shadow economy increases by one percentage 
point of GDP ceteris paribus, the growth rate of official real GDP per capita 
decreases by 1.22 percentage points of GDP. 
This negative impact of informal sector activities on economic growth is 
not broadly accepted. For example, the key feature of the model has been 
criticized, because the model is based on the assumption that the production 
technology essentially depends on tax-financed public services, which are 
subject to congestion. In addition, the informal sector is not paying any taxes 
but must pay penalties which are not used to finance public services. Based on 
these assumptions the negative correlation between the size of the informal 
sector and economic growth is therefore not very surprising. 
The positive relationship between shadow and official economy 
In the neoclassical view, the shadow economy is optimal in the sense that it 
responds to the economic environment's demand for urban services and small-
scale manufacturing. From this point of view, the informal sector provides the 
economy with a dynamic and entrepreneurial spirit and can lead to more 
competition, higher efficiency and strong boundaries and limits for government 
activities. The informal sector may offer great contributions “to the creation of 
markets, increase financial resources, enhance entrepreneurship, and transform 
  5 
the legal, social, and economic institutions necessary for accumulation” (Asea, 
1996). The voluntary self-selection between the formal and informal sectors, as 
described above in microeconomic models, may provide a higher potential for 
economic growth and, hence, a positive correlation between an increase of the 
informal sector and economic growth.  
Empirical findings of Schneider (1998) also show clearly that over 66 
percent of the earnings in the shadow economy are rather immediately spent in 
the official sector. The positive effects of this expenditure for economic growth 
and for the (indirect) tax revenues must be taken into account as well. 
Bhattacharyya (1993, 1999) found clear evidence for the United Kingdom 
(1960–84) that the hidden economy has a significant effect on consumer 
expenditures. He points out that the hidden economy has a positive effect on 
consumer expenditures of nondurable goods and services, but an even stronger 
positive effect on consumer expenditures of durable goods and services. 
Adam and Ginsburgh (1985) also focus on the implications of the shadow 
economy on “official” growth in their study concerning Belgium. They find a 
positive relationship between the growth of the shadow economy and the 
“official” one and, under certain assumptions (i.e., very low entry costs into the 
shadow economy due to a low probability of enforcement), they conclude that 
an expansionary fiscal policy has a positive stimulus for both the formal and 
informal economies. A study of the United States by Fichtenbaum (1989) 
argues that the United States productivity slowdown over the period 1970-89 
was vastly overstated, as the underreporting of income due to the more rapid 
growth of the United States shadow economy during this period was not taken 
into account. 
Snodgrass and Winkler (2004) point out that enterprise growth is an 
element of economic growth, for its favorable impact on the income and 
employment levels of targeted population and as an engine of economic 
development. Using a cross country micro and small enterprise (MSE) data set 
of to assess whether the presumed comparative advantages of MSEs hold true 
in practice, they find that there is a robust, positive relationship between the 
relative size of the MSE sector and economic growth. While informality is 
often associated with small, unregistered enterprises, one may conclude that 
there is a positive relationship between the growth of shadow economy and the 
formal one.  
Gillman and Cziraky (2004) use a MIMIC model for latent underground 
economy for Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Furthermore they estimate a 
dynamic structural equation model and investigate short-run effects of the 
underground economy on output growth and test for Granger causality and 
long-run co integrating relationships using bivariate Granger causality tests and 
Johansen,s maximum likelihood technique. The results indicate different shares 
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of underground economies across the three countries and a positive long-run 
effect of underground economy on output growth.  
Schneider and Hametner (2007) analyze the interaction between Colombian 
shadow and official economy. They find the shadow economy has a positive 
effect on the official one. Average growth rate of real per capita GDP is 1.11% 
between 1976 and 2002 and the shadow economy “explains” on average 
between 0.09 and 0.27 of this growth.  
Schneider (2004) by estimating a basic equation for a sample of 110 
developing and developed countries with further estimates for two separate sub 
samples of 21 OECD countries and 89 developing and transition countries, 
point out all three sets of regression clearly indicate that the shadow economy 
has a statistically significant influence on official economic growth. For 
transition countries and highly industrialized (OECD) countries this influence 
is positive while for developing countries the shadow economy has a negative 
influence on official growth.  
Giles (1997a, b, 1999) and Giles et al. (2002) investigate the relationship 
between the shadow and official economies for New Zealand and Canada, and 
find clear evidence of Granger Causality from official GDP to the shadow 
economy and only very mild evidence of Granger Causality in the reverse 
direction. This is supported by similar evidence for New Zealand reported by 
Giles. Considering both lines of theoretical and empirical argument, the 
relationship between the shadow economy and “official” economic growth is 
ambiguous.  
Figurer 1: Theoretical Reasoning about the Interaction between the Shadow 
and the Economic Growth 
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Kuznets’s Law 
To investigate whether the relationship between shadow economy and 
economic growth is dependent on level of development, we use the Kuznets’s 
law. Simon Kuznets’s “inverted U-curve hypothesis” is one of the most 
enduring and remarkable argument in the history of the social sciences. In the 5 
years prior to 2000, nearly 500 articles from a wide cross-section of social 
science inquiry referenced the U-curve article (Moran, 2005). Srinivasan 
(1977) call the hypothesis “some sort of iron law of development.”  
Kuznets (1955) argued that the income distribution within a country was 
likely to vary over time with its progress from a poor agricultural society to a 
rich industrial society. The average per capita income of the rural population is 
usually lower than that of the urban population, whereas income distribution 
within the urban population is more unequal. In the urban population, savings 
are concentrated in the upper-income groups and the cumulative effects of such 
savings would be the concentration of an increasing proportion of income 
yielding assets in the upper-income groups. Thus, as the weight of the urban 
sector in the economy increases with industrialization, the country’s overall 
income distribution will tend to deteriorate until such time as the urban sector 
dominates. Thereafter, the income distribution will tend to stabilize because of 
three factors: (i) the slower growth in the population of the wealthier classes; 
(ii) the exploitation of the opportunities for wealth creation offered by 
technology undertaken by those whose assets are not in established industries; 
and (iii) the shift of workers away from lower-income to higher-income 
industries. 
The literature in the 1960 and 1970s in general supported the hypothesis 
that income inequality is related to the level of per capita income  
(Ahluwalia 1976). 
According to Kuznets’ law, the relationship between income inequality and 
per capita income may be described by a curve in the shape of an inverted U, 
with an upward phase in which income inequality increases with rising per 
capita income, and a downward phase in which inequality declines with 
increases in per capita income. 
In the modern setting, economists have found a systematic relationship 
between income changes and environmental quality/pollution, and thus the 
Environmental Kuznets’s Curve (EKC) also as the other type of Kuznets Curve 
has become the backbone of environmental policy and reform (Selden and 
others, 1994).  
But during the past three decades, diverse patterns have emerged with 
respect to income distribution. Most South and East Asian economies grew at 
high per capita rates since the early 1970s while maintaining moderate levels of 
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inequality, although increasing over time, in particular in China. In contrast, 
Latin American countries grew by less than half of the average growth rate in 
South and East Asia while maintaining high inequality. The differences in 
inequality at a given rate of growth could reflect a different combination of 
policies and institutions across countries and that these differences in policies 
matter for income distribution (De Ferranti and others 2004). 
So some of the recent literature challenged this hypothesis and several 
empirical studies found no significant relationship between inequality and per 
capita income, see Anand and Kanbur (1992). Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) argue 
that the Kuznets’s curve works better for a cross section of countries at a point 
in time than for the evolution of inequality over the time within countries.  
Empirical Model Estimation Procedures 
Data that have both time series and cross sections, usually referred to as panel 
data, are common in economics. Many recent studies of the Kuznets curve have 
used panel data because it provides a rich source of information about the 
economy and allows researchers great flexibility in modeling differences in 
behavior across individuals. In our study, we used panel data covering the 
shadow economy in 21selected OECD countries over a 12-years period (1995-
2006). 
The shadow economy Kuznets curve models have been estimated in 
quadratic specifications between shadow economy and per capita income. We 
adopt of this specification in our analysis. The general form of the panel data 
model used to describe the relationship between shadow economy and income 
in this study is given in equations (1);   
( ) ( ) ( ) 
=
+
=
+++=
m
k
ititnm
n
k
itk uZyshadow
1 1
ln)ln(ln ββα       (1) 
Here, shadow  is the size of shadow economy based on Purchasing-Power-
Parity (PPP), y  is per capita GDP based on Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP), Z  
is a vector of other factors -control variables- that influence shadow , α  is the 
intercept term, u  is the error term and i  , t  represent indices of country and 
time, respectively. We estimated the model whit quadratic -inverted U- 
specification, that is 2=m .  
Panel data models examine fixed and/or random effects, one or two way of 
group of time. The core difference between fixed and random effect one or two 
way models lies in the role of the error components itu  that can take different 
structures. The specification of error components can depend solely on the 
cross section to which the observation belongs or both on the cross section and 
time series. If the specification depends on the cross section, then we have, 
itiit vu ε+=  -one way- ; and if the specification is assumed to be dependent on 
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both cross section and time series, then the error components follow 
ittiit evu ε++= -two way-. The term iv  is intended to capture the heterogeneity 
across individuals and the term te  is to represent the heterogeneity over time. 
Furthermore, iv  and te  can either be random or nonrandom –random or fixed 
effects-, and itε  is the classical error term with zero mean and homoscedastic 
covariance matrix. The nature of the error structures leads to different 
estimation procedures depending on the specification.  
For this study, we estimated the models using one-way and two-way fixed 
and random effects models with F tests, Hausman tests - compares fixed effect 
and random effect models- and Chow test -compares one-way and two-way 
models- used to evaluate the appropriateness of the model specifications.  
A more significant problem with the original "inverted U" shaped model is 
the troubling concern that a shadow economy reduction may not actually be 
occurring on global scales. The recent wave of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) has been directed towards countries with high human capital. Most of 
these countries offering a suit of incentives through tax competition to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) are categorized as tax havens. Although tax 
havens offer low or zero tax rates to MNEs, they adjust their tax regimes to 
place a grater burden on other factors of production especially labor and profits 
of local companies and induce them towards shadow activities. In the other 
hand, MNEs tend to take more advantages through tax havens by managing 
earning and transfer pricing so shadow economy increases in these countries. 
So in high level of development, the relationship between shadow economy 
and economic growth returns and actually the “inverted U curve” is an "N" 
shape. Therefore we should estimate the model whit cubic specification, that 
is 3=m . 
To calculate the cubic model, we use the correlated panel-corrected, 
standard errors (PCSE) model recommended by Beck and Katz (1995). With 
unbalanced panels, this is a Prais-Winsten estimator. Use of PCSE is consistent 
with the assumption that the disturbances across panels are heteroskedastic 
(each country has its own variance) and contemporaneously correlated across 
countries (each pair of countries has their own covariance). The estimator is a 
conservative alternative to feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). 
The expected signs of coefficients when the shadow economy kuznets’s 
curve is in quadratic form are 01 β  , 02 β  and in cubic form 
are 01 β , 02 β  and 03 β . If the shadow economy kuznets’s curve exists, 
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the return point is calculated at 
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τ  for cubic form.  
Data 
In this paper we have studied data of  21 selected OECD countries; Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States, and for time period 
of 1995-2006 at annual frequency. 
Richness of a Country 
Per capita GDP measures the relationship between economic growth and 
shadow economy1. It also directly measures the endogenous characteristics of 
growth such that it accounts for industrialization, urbanization and other 
development factors (Shafik 1994). The data source of Per capita GDP base on 
PPP is International Monetary Found (IMF). 
 Shadow Economy 
The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and 
services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the 
following reasons (Schneider 2005): 
(1) To avoid or evasion payment of income, value added or other taxes, 
(2) To avoid payment of social security contributions, 
(3) To avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as       
minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and 
(4) To avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as 
completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
Hence, in this paper, we will not deal with typical underground economic 
activities, which are all illegal actions with the characteristics of classical 
crimes like burglary, robbery, drug dealing, etc. We also do not include the 
informal household economy which consists of all household services and 
production. In this paper we use the shadow economies data constructed by 
Schneider (2007) based on the DYMIMIC and currency demand method. 
 
 
                                                 
1 - Taking per capita GDP as a measure of development remains a shadow of doubt in economic 
development literature; however it still remains an important measure used beside the other measures 
and indicators. 
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Tax and social security contribution burdens 
Studies point to tax and social security burdens are one of the main causes of 
the existence of the shadow economy. Since taxes affect labor–leisure choices, 
and also increase labor supply in the shadow economy, the distortion of the 
overall tax burden is a major concern. The greater the difference between the 
total cost of labor in the official economy and after-tax earnings from work, the 
greater is the incentive to work in the shadow economy. However, even major 
tax reforms with major tax rate deductions may not lead to a substantial 
decrease of the shadow economy. Such reforms may stabilize the size of the 
shadow economy and avoid a further increase. Social networks and personal 
relationships, high profits from irregular activities, and associated investments 
in real and human capital prevent people from transferring to the official 
economy (Schneider, 2006). 
The data of tax revnue (direct, indirect tax and social security payment) 
percent of GDP -tax burden- are used from OECD fact book 2008. 
Demographic and labor characteristics 
Demographic and labor characteristics such as population size or the labor 
force may also affect the shadow economy. As Bahl (2003, p. 13) points out, in 
countries with faster growing populations tax systems may lag behind in the 
ability to capture new taxpayers. This may increase the incentive to be active in 
the underground economy. Moreover the higher density of population in urban 
areas may further anonymity and thus reduce loyalty towards the state; this 
may lead to a higher level of shadow economy. As many sectors are city-based, 
it is expected that there the incentives to act in the underground economy are 
higher, especially when government activities and services are below 
individuals’ expectations and preferences. Thus, the higher the urbanization 
and the population size, the higher ceteris paribus the shadow economy 
(Torgler and Schneider, 2007). The data source of population is International 
Monetary Found (IMF). 
The labor force variable measures the potential pool that has the best 
preconditions to work in the shadow economy. On the other hand, individuals 
with an occupation have less leisure time at their disposal. Thus, time acts as a 
restriction to being active in the shadow economy. Unemployed people have an 
incentive not to report their additional work hours as otherwise they would lose 
their financial support. If the wage of illicit work and the financial aid together 
yield more income than regular and overtime work, taking also into account the 
costs of detection and punishment and assuming risk neutrality, full-time illicit 
work as an unemployed person yields ceteris paribus a higher utility. In such a 
situation, the danger that a person remains in the shadow economy and turns 
down job offers increases (Schneider and Enste, 2002). In sum, the higher the 
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labor force, the lower ceteris paribus the shadow economy. The labor force 
participation rate derived from OECD fact book 2008.  
Openness 
We also measure openness focusing on trade. Trade is transparent and easier to 
tax and therefore more difficult to hide in the underground economy. Thus, a 
higher trade volume in relation to countries’ GDP may lead ceteris paribus to a 
lower shadow economy (Torgler and Schneider, 2007). The data of this 
variable (trade percent of GDP) is collected from OECD fact book 2008. 
Economic freedoms 
Using different restrictions on economic activities by government, financial, 
labor, trade and investment markets and also property rights causes economic 
freedom decreasing and going people and firms towards shadow economy 
activities. The Heritage Foundation has provided economic freedom index 
since 1995. 
The definition of economic freedom encompasses all liberties and rights of 
production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services. The highest 
form of economic freedom provides an absolute right of property ownership; 
fully realized freedoms of movement for labor, capital, and goods; and an 
absolute absence of coercion or constraint of economic liberty beyond the 
extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself. In other 
words, individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way 
they please, and that freedom is both protected by the state and unconstrained 
by the state (Beach and Kane, 2008). 
Overall economic freedom, defined by multiple rights and liberties, can be 
quantified as an index of less abstract components. The index we conceive uses 
10 specific freedoms, some as composites of even further detailed and 
quantifiable components. A detailed discussion of each of these factors and 
their component variables follows this overview. 
• Business freedom is the ability to create, operate, and close an enterprise 
quickly and easily. Burdensome, redundant regulatory rules are the most 
harmful barriers to business freedom. 
• Trade freedom is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-
tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. 
• Fiscal freedom is a measure of the burden of government from the 
revenue side. It includes both the tax burden in terms of the top tax rate on 
income (individual and corporate separately) and the overall amount of tax 
revenue as a portion of gross domestic product (GDP). 
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• Government size is defined to include all government expenditures, 
including consumption and transfers. Ideally, the state will provide only true 
public goods, with an absolute minimum of expenditure. 
• Monetary freedom combines a measure of price stability with an 
assessment of price controls. Both inflation and price controls distort market 
activity. Price stability without microeconomic intervention is the ideal state 
for the free market. 
• Investment freedom is an assessment of the free flow of capital, especially 
foreign capital. 
• Financial freedom is a measure of banking security as well as 
independence from government control. State ownership of banks and other 
financial institutions such as insurer and capital markets is an inefficient 
burden, and political favoritism has no place in a free capital market. 
• Property rights is an assessment of the ability of individuals to 
accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by 
the state. 
• Freedom from corruption is based on quantitative data that assess the 
perception of corruption in the business environment, including levels of 
governmental legal, judicial, and administrative corruption. 
• Labor freedom is a composite measure of the ability of workers and 
businesses to interact without restriction by the state. 
Labor freedom is available only for recent years and not for the time period 
of this paper. It is expected that shadow economy activities decrease by 
increasing economic freedom. 
Table 1: Characteristics of sample data  
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP per capita ($) 27336.05 5786.1 14936.9 44674.8 
Shadow economy ($,000) 150.9 194.9 6.97 1001.04 
Tax burden (tax revenues % of GDP) 37.89 7.03 25.3 53.9 
Labor force precipitation rate  72.48 5.77 58.06 83.1 
Population (persons,000) 40.67 62.91 3.6 299.72 
Openness (trade % of GDP) 36.54 17.76 8.5 92.2 
Economic freedom  69.86 6.49 57.36 82.07 
Number of Observations  252    
Results and discussions  
The regression results for the one-way and two-way, fixed and random effects 
quadratic specification are presented in table 2. The Hausman test statistics is 
equaled to 15.44 and significant so the null hypothesis -model is random- is 
rejected,suggesting the fixed effects model is better than the random effects 
one. We use Chow test to compare one-way and two-way models. The F ratio 
  14 
for this test is:
( )
( )
( )
( )KnnT
RSS
n
RSSRSS
KnnTnF
−−
−
−
−
=−−−
1
21
1
1
),1( , which T  is the number of 
time period, n is the number of cross sections and K  is number of regressors in 
the model. The Chow test equal to 3.123 is higher than the critical value at the 
5 percent significant level, 1.57, suggesting that the one-way fixed effects 
model is better than a two-way fixed effects model. As shown in table 2, the 
signs of the estimated coefficients for one-way fixed effects model is in line 
with shadow economy Kuznets’s curve (SEKC). So the shadow economy 
Kuznets’s curve is existed and significant. In the other word, the size of 
shadow economy is related to the level of per capita income. To estimate 
quadratic specification of SEKC, we use three control variables labor force 
participation rate, population and economic freedom. The results show that all 
estimated coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. The F- statistics 
indicates the model is significant. With 
2R  equal to 0.948, the estimated 
shadow economy function also performs extremely well in terms of goodness-
of-fit statistics.   
Table 2: Determinants of SEKC (quadratic form) 
Fixed effects Random effects 
Regression  
Dependent variable: 
)ln( economyshadow − , 1995-2006  One Way Two Way One Way Two Way 
)ln( perGDP  477.5  
∗)48.4(  
409.0  
( )34.0  
645.5  
∗)64.4(  
768.3  
( )∗09.3  
( )2)ln( perGDP  220.0−  
∗− )68.3(  
025.0  
( )43.0  
229.0−  
∗− )85.3(  
138.0−  
( ) ∗∗− 32.2  
)ln( rateionParticipatforcelabor −−−
 
726.0−  
∗− )56.3(  
177.0−  
( )92.0−  
866.0−  
∗− )46.4(  
652.0−  
( )∗− 38.3  
)ln(Population  712.0  
∗)03.3(  
654.0  
( )∗25.3  
923.0  
∗)26.23(  
923.0  
( )∗91.20  
)ln( freedomeconomic −  288.0−  
∗− )02.3(  
238.0−  
( )∗− 76.2  
338.0−  
∗− )59.3(  
309.0−  
( )∗− 38.3  
tanCons  313.26−  
∗− )26.4(  
583.2−  
( )43.0−  
930.26−  
∗− )40.4(  
267.18−  
( )∗− 00.3  
Observations 
Groups 
2R  
F-statistic, wald chi2  
Sum square residual  
Hausman test 
Turning point 
252 
21 
0.948 
7039.78  
0.467 
 
12.37 
($235625.7) 
252 
21 
.999 
6806.1 
0.319 
 
-8.18 
($0.000280) 
252 
21 
0.924 
601.74  
0.530 
15.44  (0.00) 
12.32 
($224134.1) 
252 
21 
0.894 
416.05 
0.458 
 
13.65 
($847460.9) 
∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗  Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗  Significant at the 10 
percent level 
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The SEKC associated with quadratic functional form of the one-way fixed 
effects model is shown graphically in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: The shadow economy Kuznets’s curve 21 OECD countries  
(Quadratic form) 
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Using the quadratic specification, we obtained a turning point of $235625.7 
GDP per capita and this is very outlying and by this way, all 21 OECD 
countries are in upward phase of the inverted U curve. In other words, the 
relationship between shadow economy and economic growth is positive for all 
mentioned countries. 
The regression results for cubic specification are shown in table 3. To 
estimate shadow economy Kuznets’s curve in cubic specification, we use 11 
control variables that most of them are components of economic freedom 
index. The results show that the signs of estimated coefficients are in line with 
theoretical view.  
Tax burden, labor force participation rate, openness, population, monetary 
freedom, financial freedom, government size and property rights variables are 
significant at the 1 percent level. Freedom from corruption variable is 
significant at the 5 percent where business freedom and investment freedom are 
not significant. Other variables are also significant at the 10 percent level. 
2R  
equal to 0.976, indicates the estimated shadow economy function performs 
extremely well in terms of goodness-of-fit statistics.  
 
235625.7 
Ln 
L
n
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Table 3: Determinants of SEKC (cubic form) 
Regression  
Dependent variable: 
)ln( economyshadow − , 1995-2006 
Liner regression, correlated panels 
corrected standard error (PCSEs) 
)ln( perGDP  08.218     
∗∗∗)89.1(  
( )2)ln( perGDP  251.21−     ∗∗∗− )88.1(  
( )3)ln( perGDP  691.0      ∗∗∗)87.1(  
)ln( burdenTax −  841.0     ∗)85.8(  
)ln( rateionParticipatforcelabor −−−  705.0−     ∗− )68.3(  
)ln(Openness  073.0     ∗)86.3(  
)ln(Population  969.0      ∗)2.147(  
)sinln( freedomessBu −  114.0     )21.1(  
)ln( freedomInvestment −  047.0     )93.0(  
)ln( freedomMonetary −  045.1−     ∗− )07.4(  
)ln( freedomFinancial −  225.0−     ∗− )44.5(  
)ln( corruptionfromfreedom −−  179.0−     ∗∗− )10.2(  
)ln( sizeGovernment −  058.0     ∗)01.3(  
)ln(Pr rightsoperty −  615.0−     ∗− )14.6(  
tanCons  30.740−     ∗∗∗− )89.1(  
Observations 
Groups 
2R  
wald chi2  
Turning point 
512 
21 
0.976 
297546.5  (0.00) 
9.88 ($19535.7) 
10.65   ($42192.6) 
∗ Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗  Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗∗∗  Significant at the 10 
percent level 
 
So the N shape shadow economy Kuznet’s curve is existed and significant. 
In the other words, the size of shadow economy is related to the level of per 
capita income. Figure 3 shows the SEKC in cubic functional form.  
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Figure 3: The shadow economy Kuznets’s curve 21 OECD countries  
(Cubic form) 
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Using the cubic specification, we obtained turning points within the range 
of $19535.7- $42192.5 GDP per capita.  
As this figure shows in high level of development the relationship between 
shadow economy and economic growth returns and is again positive. For 
example in year 2006, Ireland1, Norway and USA are countries in this part of 
N-shape Kuznet’s curve and other ones in down ward part of it.  
Conclusion  
Several studies have been conducted to investigate the relationship between 
shadow economy and the official one. There are two views about this issue. 
One of them argues the relationship between shadow and official economy is 
negative and the other one emphasizes that is positive. So the relationship 
between these two variables is ambiguous. This paper attempts to analyze the 
relationship between the shadow and formal economic growth by using 
Kuznets’s curve (Inverted U-Curve). In the other word, this paper attempts to 
answer whether the relationship between shadow economy and economic 
growth depends on the level of development or not?  
                                                 
1 - Ireland has the second highest per capita income of any country in the EU next to Luxembourg and 
fourth highest in the world based on measurements of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The 
Gross National Income is  the seventh highest in the world. The unusually large divergance between 
GDP and GNI is due to the repatriation of profits by multinational companies 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_Republic_of_Ireland). 
19535.7 42192.5 
Ln 
L
n
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 In this way, the Shadow Economy Kuznets’s Curve (SEKC) is estimated in 
two quadratic and cubic functional forms by using shadow economies data of 
21 selected OECD countries for time period of 1995-2006. The panel data 
fixed and random effects analyses for quadratic form show the shadow 
economy Kuznets’s curve (SEKC) is existed and valid. So the size of shadow 
economy is related to the level of per capita income. In other words, the 
shadow economy growth has positive effect on the formal economic growth in 
the first stages of development and has negative effect on the formal economic 
growth in the later stages of development. But using the quadratic 
specification, we obtained a turning point of $235625.7 GDP per capita which 
is very outlying in a way that all 21 OECD countries are in upward phase of the 
inverted U curve. Therefore, the relationship between shadow economy and 
economic growth will be positive for all mentioned countries. 
A more significant problem with the original "inverted U" shaped model is 
the troubling concern that a shadow economy reduction may not actually be 
occurring on global scales. Then in high level of development, the relationship 
between shadow economy and economic growth may returns and actually the 
“inverted U curve” is an "N" shape. So we estimate the shadow economy 
Kuznets’s curve in cubic functional form.  To calculate the cubic model, we 
use the correlated panel-corrected, standard errors (PCSE) method. The results 
show the N shape shadow economy Kuznet’s curve is existed and significant, 
the size of shadow economy is related to the level of per capita income and in 
high level of development the relationship between shadow economy and 
economic growth returns and is again positive. The cubic functional form 
indicates turning points within the range of $19535.7- $42192.5 GDP per 
capita.  
We draw the following conclusions. The shadow economy has a positive 
effect on the official economy and vice versa. It supports the hypothesis that 
these two sectors are rather complements than substitutes. The shadow 
economy in OECD countries sustains the growth of official GDP because it 
mainly creates additional resources to reinvest in the economy.  
However, the shadow activity is a “second best” alternative that contributes 
to the production of consumer and producer goods and to economic growth. 
Compared to a Pareto optimal economy, shadow economy activity would 
appear to reduce the rate of growth, but in the real world the economy is not at 
an optimum. Given the real world with poorly defined and enforce property 
rights, poorly designed and often excessive regulation, corruption, and poor tax 
administration, the shadow economy may contribute to economic growth.  
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